Analytical Philosophy
MohammadHadi Soleimani; Davood Hosseini
Abstract
Abstract According to Zalta's Neo-Meinongean object theory, objects are either ordinary or abstract. Ordinary objects, though abstract, exemplify - rather than encode - their properties. However, it seems that objects such as mythical objects violate this inclusive and exclusive categorization. Mythological ...
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Abstract According to Zalta's Neo-Meinongean object theory, objects are either ordinary or abstract. Ordinary objects, though abstract, exemplify - rather than encode - their properties. However, it seems that objects such as mythical objects violate this inclusive and exclusive categorization. Mythological approaches claim that mythical entities have an actual existence and can be realized in distinct fictional and concrete objects. This cannot be explained by Zalta's logic. However, it can be explained by adding the class of ordinary abstract objects, which on the one hand exemplify the properties and on the other hand necessarily have these properties. This modification can explain how fictional objects can realize mythical objects. Furthermore, applying the distinction of the nature of ordinary abstract object from concrete ordinary object to Zalta's logic explains how a concrete object can be the realization of a mythical one. Thus, this extended logic, with the corresponding changes in the syntax and semantics of Zalta's logic, is able to formalize mythological findings.
Davood Hosseini
Abstract
Abstract: Kit Fine developed a logic for different concepts of ground: weak full ground, weak partial ground, strict full ground, and strict partial ground. He claimed that one can define all other concepts of ground in terms of weak full or strict full ground. Particularly, he claimed that weak and ...
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Abstract: Kit Fine developed a logic for different concepts of ground: weak full ground, weak partial ground, strict full ground, and strict partial ground. He claimed that one can define all other concepts of ground in terms of weak full or strict full ground. Particularly, he claimed that weak and strict full ground are inter-definable. He proposed the definitions as follows: strict full ground is irreversible weak full and weak full ground is nothing but preservation of strict full ground. Here, I argue that this interdefinability claim has problems. I first discriminate between two non-equivalent criteria for interdefinability: that some appropriate biconditionals are theorems of certain formal systems and that there are two formal systems for the two concepts in each of which the logical behavior of the other concept can be manifested. Then, I argue that based on these interdefinability criteria at least one of Fine’s proposed definitions fails. The conclusion is disjunctive: either there are other unknown definitions for these two concepts of ground in terms of each other or these two concepts are primitive.
Meysam Zandi; Davood Hosseini
Abstract
The theory of ground is committed to the grounding facts. As they contain non-fundamental notions, they must be grounded in something. Zero Grounding Account believes it is possible to show that by relating grounding and metaphysical argument these facts are zero-grounded. We want to introduce this theory ...
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The theory of ground is committed to the grounding facts. As they contain non-fundamental notions, they must be grounded in something. Zero Grounding Account believes it is possible to show that by relating grounding and metaphysical argument these facts are zero-grounded. We want to introduce this theory and defend it against some challenges. The first challenge is some chains that are produced in the theory and could threaten the well-foundedness of ground. The second challenge is that Zero Grounding Account is not unionist which means ground and metaphysical explanation are not the same. The third challenge is the possibility of accordance of this theory and essentialism. The theory of ground is committed to the grounding facts. As they contain non-fundamental notions, they must be grounded in something. Zero Grounding Account believes it is possible to show that by relating grounding and metaphysical argument these facts are zero-grounded. We want to introduce this theory and defend it against some challenges. The first challenge is some chains which are produced in the theory and could threaten the well-foundedness of ground. The second challenge is that Zero Grounding Account is not unionist which means ground and metaphysical explanation are not the same. The third challenge is the possibility of accordance with this theory and essentialism.
Philosophy of Logic
Volume 8, Issue 1 , April 2017, , Pages 1-13
Abstract
Cobreros et al. (2012) developed a theory of vagueness in order to model tolerance principles coherently, in the sense that not everything falls under a vague predicate and no sorites paradox is valid. It is argued in this paper that their characterization of tolerance principles does not match with ...
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Cobreros et al. (2012) developed a theory of vagueness in order to model tolerance principles coherently, in the sense that not everything falls under a vague predicate and no sorites paradox is valid. It is argued in this paper that their characterization of tolerance principles does not match with the standard conception of tolerance in the literature. In addition, their theory validates a stronger version of tolerance which suffers from clear counter examples. Furthermore, their theory validates tolerance just in a weak sense. That assimilates their theory with dominant theories of vagueness, those which accommodate tolerance principles not as true.
Analytical Philosophy
Behnam Zolqadr; Davood Hosseini
Volume 7, Issue 1 , August 2016, , Pages 31-40
Abstract
According to Modal Meinongianism, whatever is intendable is an object and existence is an ordinary property. There are two different approaches to Modal Meinongianism, in vitue of whether the objecthood of an object is dependent on behaviors or thoughts of cognitive agents or not: (1) the realist approach, ...
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According to Modal Meinongianism, whatever is intendable is an object and existence is an ordinary property. There are two different approaches to Modal Meinongianism, in vitue of whether the objecthood of an object is dependent on behaviors or thoughts of cognitive agents or not: (1) the realist approach, according to which, fictional objects belong to the domain of object and have their properties independent of whether they are intended or not. (2) Anti-realist approach, according to which, fictional objects belong to the domain of object only if they are intended. Otherwise they are not object and thus no properties are ascribed to them. In this essay we will raise some objections to Priest’s anti-realist Modal Meinongianism, and then we propose a different anti-realist approach. In our account of anti-realist Modal Meinongianism fictional objects are considered as incomplete objects.
Amir Hossein Zadyusefi; Davood Hosseini
Volume 4, Issue 2 , September 2013, , Pages 95-112
Abstract
Among contemporary Islamic philosophers, Mesbah Yazdi has proposed a theory about primitive propositions. He claims, first, that primitive propositions are analytic and secondly that concepts they are made up of, are secondary philosophical concepts. Here, we first introduce his theory of primitive propositions ...
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Among contemporary Islamic philosophers, Mesbah Yazdi has proposed a theory about primitive propositions. He claims, first, that primitive propositions are analytic and secondly that concepts they are made up of, are secondary philosophical concepts. Here, we first introduce his theory of primitive propositions and then give some counterexamples in order to show that this theory does not match with the classical characterization of primitive propositions. Some of these counterexamples are not analytic and others neither are analytic nor composed of secondary philosophical concepts. The upshot is that both Mesbah’s criteria for primitiveness are defective.
Davood Hosseini
Volume 3, Issue 1 , March 2012, , Pages 27-51
Abstract
In this paper I first explain the fuzzy system and its roots in language speakers’ intuition, as claimed by its champions. I then introduce a quasi-formal interpretation of the standard logical system of fuzzy. After that I criticize the theory in two ways: first, I argue that its proponent's responses ...
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In this paper I first explain the fuzzy system and its roots in language speakers’ intuition, as claimed by its champions. I then introduce a quasi-formal interpretation of the standard logical system of fuzzy. After that I criticize the theory in two ways: first, I argue that its proponent's responses to the problem of Exact Truth-values are irrelevant or insufficient. Second, I show the theory does not have a uniform solution to the Sorites Paradox; especially the psychological parts of proposed solutions are not persuasive.
Davood Hosseini
Volume 1, Issue 1 , March 2010, , Pages 3-26
Abstract
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The present paper attempts to introduce vagueness and Sorites paradox. First, the observational adequacy of the issue and then its logical form are presented. Later on, the philosophical matters concerning the theoretical framework of vagueness and its philosophy are discussed. Finally, the present ...
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The present paper attempts to introduce vagueness and Sorites paradox. First, the observational adequacy of the issue and then its logical form are presented. Later on, the philosophical matters concerning the theoretical framework of vagueness and its philosophy are discussed. Finally, the present theories regarding vagueness are classified on the basis of various criteria and brief explanations are provided for each of them.
